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Non-cash incomes from either private or public sources can have substantial effects 
on the distribution of economic welfare. However, standard approaches to inequality 
measurement either neglect them or take into account only selected non-monetary 
items.  Using  data  for  Greece  in  the  mid  2000s  we  show  that  it  is  possible  to 
incorporate a comprehensive list of non-monetary components into the analysis of 
income  inequality.  The  results  indicate  that  inequality  declines  sharply  when  we 
move from the distribution of disposable monetary income to the distribution of full 
income, that includes both cash and non-cash incomes.  Both private and public non-
cash  incomes  are  far  more  equally  distributed  than  monetary  income,  but  the 
inequality-reducing  effect  of  publicly  provided  in-kind  services  is  stronger.    The 
structure of inequality changes when non-cash incomes are included in the concept 
of resources, but the effects are not dramatic.  Non-cash incomes appear to accrue 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical studies of economic inequality and poverty utilize distributions of proxy 
variables  of  material  well-being  such  as  income  or  consumption.  In  particular, 
income  appears  to  be  a  straightforward  concept  for  that  purpose.  Yet  its  precise 
theoretical  definition  and,  consequently,  its  operationalization  are  quite  complex. 
The  theoretical  quest  of  what  exactly  is  income  goes  back  in  time.  According  to 
Fisher  (1906),  income  is  reflected  on  a  series  of  perceived  events  or  psychic 
experiences called enjoyment, that stem from the consumption of goods or services. 
In this sense, a person’s income is the total flow of services yielded to her from her 
property, while individuals acquire goods and services that are beneficial to them by 
means of money. In a sense, every durable good may be considered as capital that 
yields income flows and the Fisherian concept of income can serve as a basis of inter-
personal comparisons. But there are two shortcomings. First, the Fisherian definition 
focuses  on  actual  consumption,  ignoring  capital  accumulation.  Second,  it  is  very 
difficult to measure it objectively. As Haig (1921, p. 58) points out “it is necessary for 
practical reasons to disregard the intangible psychological factors and have regard either for 
the money-worth of the goods and services utilized during a certain period or for the money 
itself received during the period supplemented by the money-worth of such good and services 
as are received directly without a money transaction”. Thus, Haig (1921, p.59) defined 
income as “the increase or accretion in one’s power to satisfy his wants in a given period of 
time,  insofar  that  power  consists  of  (a)  money  itself,  or  (b)  by  anything  susceptible  in 
valuation in money terms”. Simons (1938, p. 50) proposed a neat and comprehensive 
definition that breaks down an individual’s income into the actual consumption and 
the net increase of his wealth during a certain period of time: “Personal income may be 
defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and 
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end 
of a period.”. This definition is also known as Haig-Simons definition of income or as 
the Hicksian concept of income after its elegant presentation in Hicks (1939). 
The  above  definition  can  serve  as  a  definition  of  full  income.  It  moves  beyond 
monetary  income and, therefore, reflects  more accurately the  actual  well-being  of 
economic  agents.  It  should  be  made  clear  that  (a)  full  income  measures  the 
individual’s potential to consume and not just her realized consumption, and, (b) it 
refers to the “market value” of rights exercised in consumption. The latter implies 
that consumption should not arise necessarily from a market transaction that took 
place  at  the  particular  income  reference  period.  Therefore,  the  definition  of  full 
income  should  include  items  such  as  the  consumption  of  services  derived  from 
physical assets1, publicly provided goods and services2, home production of goods 
and services and non-pecuniary benefits from work. Note that the monetary value of 
leisure time is not included in the Haig-Simons definition.  
The  importance  of  using  full  income  for  the  analysis  of  income  inequality  and 
poverty has been well understood in empirical economics, (see for example the early 
contributions of Smeeding (1977, 1982)). In recent years, experts in the field have 
made clear that distributional studies should move beyond the use of conventional 
                                                              
1 As Marshall (1920, p. 64) explains “But a broader use of this term is occasionally needed, which 
embraces the whole income of benefits of every sort which a person derives from the ownership of 
property however applied: it includes for instance the benefits which he gets from the use of his own 
piano, equally with those which a piano dealer would win by letting out a piano on hire.”.  
2 Pure public goods are excluded. 
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measures  of  monetary  disposable  income  (Atkinson  and  Bourguignon,  2000; 
Canberra Group, 2001; Atkinson et al., 2002). Indeed, a rich literature emerged that 
takes  into  account  non-monetary  income.  Yet,  most  of  these  studies  focus  on 
particular  non-monetary  income  components.    For  example,  a  number  of  studies 
focus on the distributional effects of in-kind public education transfers (James and 
Benjamin,  1987;  Selden  and  Wasylenko,  1995;  Tsakloglou  &  Antoninis,  1999; 
Antoninis and Tsakloglou, 2001; Callan et al., 2008). Similarly, several authors add 
the monetary value of imputed rents in the distributions of disposable income in 
order to measure the distributional consequences of homeownership (Yates, 1993; 
Frick and Grabka 2003; Gasparini and Escudero, 2004; Pryor 2007; Frick et al., 2010). 
Others, motivated by the fact that in developed countries nearly half of welfare state 
budget  finances  the  provision  of  publicly  provided  services,  study  the  combined 
distributional effects of in-kind public transfers, (Evandrou et al., 1993; Aaberge et 
al., 2006; Garfinkel et al., 2006; Marical et al., 2008; Paulus et al., 2010). These authors 
are  interested  in  exploring  certain  distributional  aspects  of  specific  non-monetary 
income and  do  not provide  an overall  picture of  the  distributional effect of non-
monetary incomes. On the contrary, there are few studies that take into account both 
in-kind  public  transfers  and  private  non-monetary  incomes  in  order  to  reassess 
aggregate inequality (or poverty) under a definition of full (or near full) income (see, 
for example, Smeeding et al., 1993; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995; Callan and Keane, 
2009). In the context of Greece, there is a lack of such study and the present paper 
attempts to fill this gap. In particular, we estimate the monetary value of in-kind 
public  transfers  in  the  fields  of  education  and  health  care,  imputed  rents, 
consumption  of  own  farm  and  non-farm  production,  in  kind  intrahousehold 
transfers and fringe benefits and add them to the distribution of monetary disposable 
income, thus deriving the distribution of full income. The next section describes the 
methodology. Section 3 contains the results of empirical analysis and, finally, section 
4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodological settings 
The  study  utilizes  the  microdata  of  the  2004/5  Greek  Household  Budget  Survey 
(HBS)  that  covers  the  entire  Greek  population  and  has  a  sample  of  over  6,500 
households with almost 17,500 members. The database includes information about 
all  monetary  incomes  (wages,  pensions,  capital  income,  income  from  self-
employment  and  social  transfers)  net  of  income  taxes  and  social  insurance 
contributions as well as  non-monetary income components such as consumption of 
own  farm  and  non-farm  production,  in-kind  intrahousehold  transfers  and  fringe 
benefits. It also includes information that can be used for estimating the monetary 
value of publicly provided services (education and health care) and the monetary 
value  of  homeownership  (imputed  rents).  Our  purpose  was  to  exploit  all  the 
available information of the survey so as to compile a comprehensive list of non-
monetary  income  components.  Unfortunately,  the  HBS  does  not  contain  time-use 
information – in fact, no such information is available in Greece – and, consequently 
we were not able to estimate the value of home production of services.3 
                                                              
3 The rest of the transfers of in-kind public services in Greece are either very small in size 
(publicly housing, childcare etc) or they are pure or almost pure public goods (defense, law 
and order, etc). 4 
 
Income is set as proxy of the unobservable welfare of the household. The unit of 
analysis is the individual in the context of the household and the distributions used 
are distributions of equivalised household disposable income per capita. In order to 
compare meaningfully the incomes of heterogeneous households, income is adjusted 
using the “modified OECD equivalence scales” that assign weights of 1.00 to the 
household head, 0.50 to each of the remaining adults in the household and 0.30 to 
each child (person aged below 14). Furthermore, cost-sharing within the household is 
assumed. The household is treated as a single spending unit and all incomes are 
added up in order to form total household income.  
In the main part of the empirical analysis, relative inequality is measured using the 
Gini index and indices from the parametric family of Atkinson indices. They satisfy 
the  basic  axioms  of  inequality  measurement  (symmetry,  mean  independence, 
population  invariance  and  the  principle  transfers).  The  Atkinson  indices  are 
explicitly based on social welfare functions. Their welfare interpretation is simple; 
they measure the proportion of total income that could be redistributed with no loss 
of social welfare, if the remaining income were to be equally distributed {Lambert 
(2001)].  By  setting  arbitrary  values  at  the  inequality  aversion  parameter  that 
characterises  the  index,  the  analysis  can  capture  a  wide  range  of  distributional 
preferences.  For the  purposes of  the  study, the  parameter was set at 0.5  and 1.5.  
Taking into account that, in comparison with other indices used in empirical studies, 
the Gini index is relatively sensitive to changes clos to the middle of the distribution 
while the Atkinson index for inequality aversion parameters 0.5 and 1.5 are relatively 
more  sensitive  to  changes  close  to  the  top  and  bottom  of  the  distribution, 
respectively, this  choice covers a  wide range  of  social preferences  with regard  to 
aversion  to  inequality.    When  we  attempt  inequality  decomposition  by  factor 
components we use the family of “ethically flexible” Gini indices, while when we 
attempt decomposition by population sub-groups we use the Mean Log Deviation. 
The  following  paragraphs  describe  briefly  the  estimation  techniques  used  for  the 
computation of the monetary value of non-monetary income components. 
Estimation of imputed rents:  The imputed income derived from homeownership is 
estimated  using  the  “opportunity  cost”  approach,  (Frick  and  Grabka,  2003).  The 
rationale of this approach is that if the homeowners weren’t homeowners they would 
have had to pay a rent. This fictitious rent could be estimated using information from 
the actual rental market. The procedure goes as follows; first, we gather information 
on  housing  characteristics  (size  of  the  dwelling,  neighborhood  characteristics, 
construction  year,  house  amenities  etc.)  as  well  as  actual  rents  paid  (for  renting 
households). Then, we use the subsample of renters in order to estimate a hedonic 
model of rent determination and, in the next stage, we apply the model’s estimates to 
the subsample of homeowners in order to derive an estimate of the rent they would 
have had to pay if they were renters. The model controls for selectivity bias through 
a two-stage Heckman procedure which consists of a selection equation in the first 
stage  and  a  hedonic  regression  in  the  second  stage.  Net  imputed  rents  were 
computed  after  subtracting  mortgage  interest  payments  as  well  as  other  owner-
related costs.4 
Estimation of education transfers: The estimates of the monetary value of in-kind public 
transfers  in  the  field  of  education  by  education  level  (primary  secondary  and 
tertiary)  were  derived  using  static  incidence  analysis  under  the  assumption  that 
                                                              
4 Detailed estimates are available from the authors on request. 5 
 
public  education  transfers  do  not  create  externalities,  (Tsakloglou  and  Antoninis, 
1999).  The beneficiaries of the public transfers are assumed to be the recipients of the 
public education services.  Moreover, it is assumed that the value of the transfer to 
the beneficiary is equal to the average cost of producing the public education services 
in the corresponding level of education.  We also assume that the benefit is shared by 
all  household  members  (not  only  by  the  direct  beneficiary);  in  other  words,  we 
implicitly assume that in the absence of the public transfer the burden of financing 
the provision of education services would be borne by the household.   Since the HBS 
provides information on whether the students in its sample attend a private or a 
public  educational  institution,  the  corresponding  benefits  were  allocated  only  to 
students attending public institutions.5 
Estimation of public health care transfers: In order to estimate the value of public health 
care services, the risk-related “insurance value approach” was adopted (Smeeding et 
al., 1993).  The “insurance value” is the amount that an insured person would have to 
pay in each age group so that the government would have just enough revenue to 
cover all claims for the persons that belong to this group.  In other words, the value 
of public health care services provided are equivalent to funding an insurance policy 
where  the  value  of  the  premium  is  the  same  for  everybody  sharing  the  same 
characteristics,  such  as  age.  Then,  this  value  is  added  to  the  income  of  each 
individual.  We  calculated  per  capita  expenditures  for  each  age  group  using  the 
information  of  the  OECD  Social  Expenditure  database  (SOCX).    The  estimates 
include all public expenditure on health care, including inter alia, expenditure on in-
patient care, ambulatory medical services, pharmaceutical goods and prevention, but 
they do not include non-reimbursed individual health expenditures or cash benefits 
related to sickness. 
Estimation of consumption of own farm and non-farm production, fringe benefits and in-kind 
transfers from other households: The monetary value of these non-cash components was 
readily available in the HBS.  Some of the information was self-assessed, in some 
cases information on quantities was provided by the respondents and was combined 
with price information by the enumerators, while in the case of company cars an 
elaborate estimation method was applied using characteristics of the vehicle.  
Finally,  the  full  income  was  defined  as  the  sum  of  monetary  disposable  income, 
private non-cash income and in-kind public transfers.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Composition of full income distribution 
The Graph 1 depicts the composition of full income both for the entire population 
and for quintiles (when the population is ranked into five groups of equal size from 
the  poorest  to  the  richest  according  to  their  equivalized  full  income).  The 
composition of full income for the entire population is depicted in the last column of 
the graph.  Over a quarter of full income is non-monetary. Imputed rent is the largest 
non-monetary component; 8.7 per cent of full income. The large share of imputed 
rent is not surprising since over four fifths of the population live in owner occupied 
dwellings and the great majority are outright owners (without mortgages).  Public 
                                                              
5  For  a  detailed  description of  the  method  used for  the derivation  of these  estimates  see 
Koutsampelas and Tsakloglou (2012) 6 
 
health care services represent 8.0 per cent of full income, in-kind education transfers 
6.5 per cent and, finally, 2.7 per cent of full income stems from other private non-cash 
income sources.  
 
Graph 1: Composition of full income per quintile 
 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, 2004/5. 
 
The  composition  of  full  income  varies  across  quintiles.  The  relative  share  of 
monetary income increases as we move up to higher quintiles.  Simply put, the richer 
the  quintile,  the  heavier  its  reliance  on  monetary  income.  This  is  an  interesting 
finding that, to some extent, reflects the unequal outcomes of private markets (since 
rewards in markets are mostly in cash). Thus, non-monetary income accounts for less 
than  a  sixth  of  the  full income  of  the  richest  quintile,  but  almost  half  of  the  full 
income  of  the  poorest  quintile.  The  large  share  of  non-monetary  income  of  the 
poorest quintile is due to the high importance of in-kind public transfers (almost 30 
per  cent  is  accounted  by  public  education  and  health  care  transfers  in-kind). 
Focusing on non-cash incomes, we observe that as we move to richer quintiles, non-
monetary  resources  consist  mainly  of  “private”  components.  In  the  top  quintile, 
private non-monetary income components account for 8.5 per cent of full income, 
while the corresponding share of public in-kind transfers is 7.1 per cent. 
The distribution of full income differs substantially from the distribution of monetary 
income. Table 1 highlights these important differences. The left panel of the table 
compares the quintile income shares of monetary income and the induced changes in 
the  income  shares  of  quintiles  as  we  add  the  non-cash  components.  The  income 
shares  of  the  three  lower  quintiles  increase,  while  those  of  the  fourth  and, 
particularly, the fifth quintile decrease as we move from the monetary to the full 
distribution of income. The most pronounced differences are observed in the poorest 
quintile due to its heavy dependence on in-kind public transfers. Its income share 
increases from 7.42% to 8.57% if we add only private non-cash income to monetary 
















Table 1: Descriptives 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, 2004/5. 
 
when  we  consider  all  income  sources  together.  The  middle  panel  of  the  table 
describes the relative size of non-monetary income (the ratio of the sum of the non-
monetary  income  to  the  monetary  income  of  the  quintile).  We  observe  that  the 
relative  size  of  non-cash  income  is  negatively  correlated  with  disposable  income. 
Finally, the right panel of the table reports monthly estimates of the mean value of 
non-cash income per capita for each quintile. A U-shaped pattern emerges. Mean 
private  non-cash  income  decrease  initially  (€91.8,  €88.3,  €82.7  for  the  first  three 
quintiles) and thereafter increases (€92.8, €123.4 for the top quintiles). This pattern 
reflects the fact that the consumption of own production and in-kind intra-household 
transfers  are  concentrated  more  to  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution,  while 
imputed  rents  increase  as  we  move  up  to  richer  quintiles  (naturally,  richer 
households reside in more luxurious homes). On the other hand, the average value of 
in-kind  public  transfers  is  negatively  correlated  with  monetary  income.  This  is 
because the elderly, who are disproportionately concentrated in the poor quintiles, 
benefit  most  from  in-kind  public  health  care  transfers,  while  the  rich  households 
substitute publicly provided education with private services.  
 
3.2 Concentration curves  
The  findings  of  section  3.1  imply  that  non-monetary  income  is  more  equally 
distributed  than  monetary  income.  This  is  examined  analytically  in  Graph  2  that 
plots the  concentration  curve for  each non-monetary  component and  compares it 
with  the  Lorenz  curve  for  the  distribution  of  monetary  income  and  the  line  of 
complete equality. 
All  concentration  curves  (apart  from  that  of  imputed  rent)  lie  above  the  line  of 
complete equality. In-kind public transfers and other private non-cash incomes are 
disproportionally concentrated to the poorest quintiles in both absolute and relative 
terms. Other private non-cash incomes are most “equally” distributed, followed by 
public health care services, public education transfers and, finally, imputed rents. 
 
Quintile 
Income shares    Non-monetary income as %  
of monetary income 
  Mean monthly non-monetary 






































1  7.42  8.57  9.48  10.21    37.6  57.2  94.7    91.9  129.6  221.6 
2  12.56  13.27  13.98  14.34    21.7  33.0  54.6    88.3  124.1  212.4 
3  16.96  17.29  17.68  17.73    15.9  23.5  39.5    82.7  115.8  198.5 
4  22.87  22.65  22.53  22.37    13.5  16.7  30.1    92.8  108.8  201.6 
5  40.18  38.22  36.32  35.34    10.1  8.4  18.5    123.4  96.9  220.3 
All                15.4  19.7  35.1    95.8  115.0  210.9 8 
 
Graph 2: Concentration curves for non-monetary income components 
 
  Notes:  
(a)  L(p):  Lorenz curve for the distribution of monetary income 
Cir(p):  Concentration curve for imputed rents 
Cother(p):  Concentration curve for other private non-monetary incomes 
Ceduc(p):  Concentration curve for public education transfers 
Chealth(p):  Concentration curve for public health care transfers 
(b)   DAD software was used for the estimation of the concentration curves 
 
The ranking reverses in the upper part of the distribution, where the concentration 
curve for public education transfers dominates the rest of the concentration curves.  
Graph 3 plots the aggregate concentration curves for private, public and total non-
monetary incomes. The concentration curve for total non-monetary incomes almost 
coincides  with  the  line of  perfect  equality  indicating  that  these  components,  as  a 
whole, are equally distributed in absolute terms. This is the combined outcome of the 
distribution patterns of the public and private non-cash incomes. As anticipated, the 
concentration  curve  for  public  non-monetary  incomes  lies  wholly  above  the 
concentration curve for private non-monetary incomes. 
 
3.3 Inequality comparisons 
The former analysis provides qualitative evidence that non-monetary incomes are 
likely to exert an equalizing effect on the income distribution. In this  section, we 
estimate indices of relative inequality in order to measure the redistributive effect of 
these  components  and,  ultimately,  reassess  aggregate  inequality  under  the  more 
comprehensive definition of full income. The figures in Table 2 measure the  9 
 
Graph 3: Concentration curves for public, private and all non-cash incomes 
 
Notes:  
(a)  L(p):  Lorenz curve for the distribution of monetary income 
Cpub(p):  Concentration curve for in kind public transfers 
Cpriv(p):  Concentration curve for private non-monetary incomes 
Call(p):  Concentration curve for all non-monetary incomes 
(b)  DAD software was used for the estimation of the concentration curves 
 
proportional changes in each inequality index when we move from the distribution 
of disposable income to the distribution of full income. Public health care transfers 
induce the largest decline in inequality (the Gini index declines by -10.9% and the 
two  Atkinson  indices  by  -20.8%  and  -23.3%,  respectively).  Despite  their 
progressivity, other non-monetary incomes exhibit the smallest inequality-reducing 
effect, due to their small size in absolute terms (the Gini index declines by -3.4%, 
Atkinson (e=0.5) by -7.1% and Atkinson (e=1.5) by -8.5%). The redistributive effect of 
in-kind public transfers is stronger than that of private non-cash incomes. The value 
of the Gini index declines by -16.8% due to in-kind public transfers against a -8.3% 
reduction due to private non-monetary incomes. The corresponding percentages for 
Atkinson (e=0.5) are -30.9% and -16.7% and for Atkinson (e=1.5) -32.5% and -19.3%, 
respectively.  Full income is far less unequally distributed than the monetary income. 
When non-monetary income components are added to the concept of resources, Gini 
declines by 22.1%, Atkinson (e=0.5) by 39.6% and Atkinson (e=1.5), that is the most 
sensitive  of  the  three  to  changes  close  to  the  bottom  of  the  distribution,  by  a 
staggering -41.8%.  
  
   10 
 
Table 2: Inequality under alternative income concepts 



























Gini  0.3217  -5.3  -3.4  -8.3  -6.4  -10.9  -16.8  -22.1 
Atkinson 0.5  0.0849  -11.1  -7.1  -16.7  -12.1  -20.8  -30.9  -39.6 
Atkinson 1.5  0.2406  -13.3  -8.5  -19.3  -10.8  -23.3  -32.5  -41.8 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, 2004/5. 
 
3.4 Structure of inequality  
Naturally, the transition from monetary income to full income is likely to change not 
only the level but the structure of inequality.  In Table 3, we estimate the contribution 
of  each  component  of  monetary  and  full  income  to  total  inequality  and  the 
corresponding elasticities of inequality using factor component analysis (Shorrocks, 
1982).  For  the  purposes  of  the  analysis,  we  employ  the  parametric  Gini  index 
(Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978).  The higher (lower) the value of the inequality 
parameter n (in our case n = 0.5, 2 and 4), the more sensitive the index to changes 
close to the bottom (top) of the distribution.6 
The  first  two  columns  report  the  shares  of  monetary  and  non-monetary  income 
components  in  the  two  distributions.    The  remaining  of  the  table  reports  the 
contribution  of  each  component  to  aggregate  inequality  and  the  elasticity  of 
inequality with respect to the corresponding income component; that is, the ceteris 
paribus  proportional  change  in  aggregate  inequality  due  to  an  increase  of  each 
particular component by 1%.7  Several interesting results are reported in the table.  
As expected the contribution of non-monetary components to aggregate inequality is 
lower than their income share and, hence, they tend to reduce inequality.  However, 
in the cases of public education and imputed rent this progressivity declines as the 
value  of the inequality aversion  parameter rises.   This may  be  an indication that 
relatively few beneficiaries as such non-cash incomes are located to the very bottom 
of the distribution.  Mild declines are also observed regarding other private non-cash 
income components while no such trend is observed in the case of public health care 
transfers.    Irrespective  of  the  value  of  the  inequality  aversion  parameter,  the 
(negative) elasticity of inequality in the distribution of full income is always higher 
with  respect  to  non-monetary  public  rather  than  non-monetary  private  incomes.  
Further, it is worth noting that the equalizing effect of monetary income components 
such  as  pensions,  other  social  transfers  and  self-employment  income  from 
agricultural  activities  declines  when  we  move  from  the  distribution  of  monetary 
income  to  the  distribution  of  cash  income,  while  the  disequalizing  effects  of 
components  such  as  capital  income,  income  from  self-employment  in  the  non-
agricultural sector and (in most cases) wages and salaries rise.  All in all,  
Next,  we  turn  to  inequality  decomposition  by  population  sub-groups  (Shorrocks, 
1980).  In this type of inequality decomposition, when the population is partitioned  
                                                              
6 When n=2, the index is the usual Gini index. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































into non-overlapping and exhaustive groups, aggregate inequality is attributed to 
inequalities “within” groups and inequalities “between” groups.  Since neither the 
Gini index nor the Atkinson index are additively decomposable, for the purposes of 
our  analysis  we  used  the  Mean  Log  Deviation  as  index  of  inequality.  8    The 
population is partitioned according to household type, socioeconomic status of the 
household head, educational level of the household head and age of the population 
member.   
The results of decomposition inequality by population subgroups are reported in 
Table 4. The first column of the table (A) reports the population shares of the various 
subgroups and the next two columns (B and C) their relative mean incomes (Greece: 
100.0)  under  the  two  concepts  of  resources.    Column  D  reports  the  points  of 
percentage difference in mean relative incomes as we move from monetary income 
to full income.   The following columns  show the level of  inequality within  each 
subgroup using monetary and full income (E and F) and the proportional change in 
the index (G).  Finally, columns H and I report the contribution of each subgroup to 
aggregate inequality in the distribution of monetary and full income.  Below each 
population  grouping  we  report  the  value,  the  proportional  change  and  the 
contribution  to  aggregate  inequality  that  can  be  attributed  to  inequality  “within 
groups” and “between groups”. 
In comparison to other inequality indices that are widely used in similar studies, the 
Mean Log Deviation is relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the 
distribution.  The level of decline in aggregate inequality recorded by the Mean Log 
Deviation  when  we  move  from  the  distribution  of  monetary  income  to  the 
distribution of full income (-42.8%) is similar to that recorded by the Atkinson (1.5) 
index.  The results of Table 4 suggest that irrespective of the concept of resources, the 
bulk  of  inequality  emanates  from  differences  “within”  rather  than  “between” 
population subgroups.  However, the proportion of aggregate inequality accounted 
by  differences  “between  groups”  varies  very  considerably  across  population 
partitions (over 15% when the population is partitioned by the household head’s 
education level, 8-10% when it is partitioned by the household head’s socioeconomic 
status, less than 4% when it is partitioned by household type or age of the population 
member).  The results of column D suggest that when we move from the distribution 
of  monetary  income  to  the  distribution  of  full  income  we  observe  a  substantial 
improvement  in  the  relative  income  position  of  a  number  of  low-income  groups 
(elderly  and  mono-parental  households)  and  a  decline  in  the  relative  position  of 
well-off groups (member of households with heads who are white collar workers or 
tertiary education graduates).  Regarding the change in the level of inequality within 
particular population subgroups when we move from the distribution of monetary 
income to the distribution of full income, the evidence is not entirely clear, although 
as  a  rule  the  decline  is  proportionally  larger  in  high-inequality  groups  (mono-
parental  households,  households  with  heads  with  low  educational  qualifications) 
and smaller in low-inequality groups (member of households with heads who are 
blue or white collar workers or tertiary education graduates).  However, there are 
also striking exceptions (see, for example, the spectacular decline in the  
                                                              
8  Technically,  any  additively  decomposable  index  can  be  used.  The  advantage  of  Mean 
Logarithmic Deviation is that within-group inequality contributions do not depend on the 
mean  income  of  the  groups  or,  in  other  words,  subgroup  inequality  is  only  population-
weighted. This is an attractive property in our context. 
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Table 4: Inequality decomposition by population subgroups 
Characteristic of household or household head  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I 
Household Type                   
Older single persons or couples (at least one 65+)  7.8  71.4  82.7  11.3  0.139  0.067  -52.1  6.1  5.1 
Younger single persons or couples (none 65+)  18.0  98.4  98.8  0.4  0.227  0.125  -44.8  22.8  22.0 
Couples with children up to 18 (no other HH members)  33.6  103.5  104.8  1.3  0.179  0.104  -42.1  33.7  34.1 
Mono-parental households  1.5  82.0  93.2  11.2  0.211  0.091  -56.9  1.8  1.3 
Other household types  39.1  104.3  100.2  -4.1  0.151  0.094  -38.0  33.0  35.8 
     “Within groups” inequality          0.174  0.101  -42.2  97.6  98.6 
     “Between groups” inequality          0.005  0.002  -64.5  2.4  1.4 
Socioeconomic group of HH head                   
Blue collar worker  23.3  88.5  88.1  -0.4  0.095  0.058  -38.8  12.4  13.2 
White collar worker  14.9  137.1  129.2  -7.9  0.102  0.069  -32.4  8.5  10.1 
Self-employed (non-agricultural sector)  20.2  110.8  110.0  -0.8  0.263  0.147  -44.0  29.7  29.0 
Self-employed (agricultural sector)  3.0  90.6  92.7  2.1  0.300  0.159  -46.9  5.0  4.6 
Self-employed  23.3  108.0  107.9  -0.1  0.270  0.150  -44.4  35.1  34.2 
Unemployed  2.3  71.2  75.1  3.9  0.139  0.076  -45.0  1.8  1.7 
Pensioner  27.9  89.5  92.8  3.3  0.168  0.088  -47.2  26.1  24.1 
Other  8.4  86.7  90.6  3.9  0.175  0.087  -50.0  8.2  7.2 
     “Within groups” inequality          0.164  0.092  -43.7  91.7  90.1 
     “Between groups” inequality          0.015  0.010  -31.6  8.3  9.9 
Education level of HH head                   
Tertiary education  20.4  146.9  136.6  -10.3  0.137  0.097  -28.9  15.6  19.4 
Upper secondary education  27.0  101.2  101.6  0.4  0.147  0.085  -42.2  22.1  22.3 
Lower secondary education  13.0  89.0  90.6  1.6  0.149  0.082  -45.2  10.8  10.4 
Primary education or less  39.5  78.6  83.1  4.5  0.160  0.078  -51.2  35.3  30.1 
     “Within groups” inequality          0.150  0.084  -43.9  84.3  82.9 
     “Between groups” inequality          0.029  0.018  -37.0  15.7  17.1 
Age of population member                   
Below 25  27.0  95.9  98.6  2.7  0.171  0.096  -43.8  25.8  25.4 
25-64  52.5  109.2  105.0  -4.2  0.174  0.109  -37.7  51.1  55.7 
Over 64  20.6  82.2  89.3  7.1  0.172  0.085  -50.4  19.8  17.2 
     “Within groups” inequality          0.173  0.101  -41.9  96.4  97.9 
     “Between groups” inequality          0.006  0.002  -68.6  3.6  2.1 
ALL           0.179  0.102  -42.8       
Notes:  
A:   Population Share 
B:   Relative Group Income (Monetary Income, Greece: 100.0) 
C:   Relative Group Income (Full Income, Greece: 100.0) 
D:   B-C 
E:   Mean Log Deviation (Monetary Income) 
F:   Mean Log Deviation (Full Income) 
G:   % Change in Inequality 
H:   % Contribution to Aggregate Income Inequality (Monetary Income) 
I:    % Contribution to Aggregate Income Inequality (Full Income) 
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low-inequality group of households consisting of elderly single or elderly couples).  
As a consequence of these changes, the movement from the distribution of monetary 
income to the distribution of full income is associated with an increase in the share of 
inequality that is accounted by differences “between group” when the population is 
partitioned according to education level (from 15.7% to 17.1%) and socioeconomic 
group (from 8.3% to 9.9%) of the household head, whereas when the population is 
partitioned  according  to  demographic  factors  (household  type  and  age  of  the 
population  member),  the  share  of  differences  “between-groups”  declines  further 
from already low levels (from 2.4% to 1.4% and 3.6% to 2.1%, respectively). 
 
3.5 Non-monetary income in a life cycle perspective 
The evidence of Table 4 seems to suggest that the non-cash components are age-
related and, therefore, it may be better to examine them in a life-cycle perspective. 
Indeed,  education-related  transfers  are  directed  almost  exclusively  to  households 
with young members, while health-related transfers accrue disproportionally to the 
elderly. To some extent, this also holds for imputed rents.  Graph 4 depicts the the 
relative income position (average equivalized income of the group relative to the 
overall  average  income)  of  ten-year  age  cohorts  under  alternative  concepts  of 
resources.  There are four lines in the graph, corresponding to monetary income, 
monetary  income  augmented  by  private  in-kind  incomes,  monetary  income 
augmented by public in-kind incomes and full income. 
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As the graph indicates, non-monetary income flattens the life-cycle profile of relative 
income positions. If we ignore non-monetary income, we observe that the middle-
aged  are  better  off  than  the  young  and  the  elderly.  However,  after  taking  into 
account non-monetary income, both the young and the elderly improve their relative 
income positions. Both private and public in-kind incomes are contributing to this 
change,  but  careful  inspection  of  the  evidence  reveals  that  the  effect  of  publicly 
provided non-cash incomes is substantially stronger.  Hence, non-cash incomes seem 
to enables households to smooth their consumption across their lifecycle.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimated the distribution of full income in Greece using a large, 
but not exhaustive, list of non-monetary incomes. The non-cash incomes considered 
account for over a third of disposable income.  Inequality declines sharply when we 
move from the distribution of disposable monetary income to the distribution of full 
income, irrespective of the index of inequality used.  Both private and public non-
cash  incomes  are  far  more  equally  distributed  than  monetary  income,  but  the 
inequality-reducing  effect  of  publicly  provided  in-kind  services  is  stronger.    The 
structure of inequality changes when non-cash incomes are included in the concept 
of resources, but the changes are not dramatic.  Further, non-cash incomes appear to 
accrue  more  heavily  to  younger  and  older  individuals,  thus  reducing  differences 
across age groups. 
As noted in the introduction, the most important omission from our analysis was 
that of home-produced services.  Time use data are needed in order to estimate the 
distributional effects of these services and no such information is available in Greece.  
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  estimation  of  the  value  of  home-produced 
services  is  marred  with  numerous  theoretical  and  empirical  problems.    From  a 
theoretical point of view, the most important problem is that it is not entirely clear 
which services should be included in the list, since many of them are clearly leisure-
related.9 From an empirical point of view, it is not obvious whether the time spent for 
the production of these services should be evaluated at the opportunity cost of the 
individual involved (i.e. her wage rate, using an “opportunity cost” approach) or the 
market  wage  used  for  the  production  of  such  services.    As  Jenkins  and  O’Leary 
(1996) show using UK data, the resulting estimates as well as their distributional 
consequences vary widely depending on the method employed.10 
One important caveat of the paper has to do with the equivalence scales used in the 
analysis.  In line with most studies found in the relevant empirical literature, we used 
                                                              
9 As Marshall (1920, pp. 64-65) puts it eloquently “From this point of view income is regarded as 
including all the benefits which mankind derive at any time from their efforts, in the present and in the 
past, to turn nature's resources to their best account. The pleasure derived from the beauties of the 
rainbow, or the sweet taste of the fresh morning air, are left out of the reckoning, not because they are 
unimportant, nor because the estimate would in any way be vitiated by including them; but solely 
because reckoning them in would serve no good purpose, while it would add greatly to the length of our 
sentences and  the  prolixity  of our  discussions.  For  a  similar  reason it  is not worth  while  to  take 
separate account of the simple services which nearly every one renders to himself, such as putting on 
his clothes; though there are a few persons who choose to pay others to do such things for them. Their 
exclusion involves no principle; and time spent by some controversial writers on discussing it has been 
wasted. It simply follows the maxim De minimis non curat lex”. 
10 Similar conclusions are also reached by Frick et al (2007) for Germany and D’Ambrosio and 
Gigliarano (2008) for Italy. 16 
 
the  same  equivalence  scales  for  the  analysis  of  both  monetary  income  and  full 
income.  This is probably uncontroversial in the case of private non-cash incomes, 
but may be problematic in the case of public education and public health care where 
needs are characterized by strong life-cycle patterns. The equivalence scales that are 
used in order to measure inequality in disposable monetary income are “conditional” 
on  the  existence of  free  public education and  free  public health care  (Pollak and 
Wales, 1979; Blundell and Lewbel, 1991).  By including publicly provided services in 
the new concept of resources (full income), essentially we treat them like private 
commodities that households must pay for in order to obtain them. Hence, it might 
be argued that the equivalence scales should be modified so as to reflect the higher 
needs of particular types of households for these services.  In other words, the results 
may overestimate the redistributive impact of publicly provided non-cash incomes 
(Radner, 1997).  The construction of “appropriate” equivalence scales is not an easy 
task and there is no widely acceptable method for accounting for differences in needs 
for such services.11 
Finally, it should be noted that the results of the paper have clear policy implications.  
Non-monetary incomes are large in size, improve the welfare of their recipients and 
they are allocated in a very different pattern than monetary incomes.  Therefore, 
ignoring  non-cash  incomes  when  designing  policies  aiming  to  reduce  inequality 
and/or alleviate poverty  can  easily result  in  imperfect  targeting,  misallocation  of 
resources and inefficiencies. 
 
   
                                                              
11 A number of studies attempting to analyse this problem can be found in the literature, but 
they usually focus on small population groups (esp. the disabled); see, for example Jones and 
O’Donnell (1995), Klavus (1999), Zaidi and Burchardt (2005), and Berloffa et al. (2006).  An 
interesting theoretical approach is explored in Aaberge et al. (2010).  Their results as well as 
the results of Paulus et al (2010) suggest that, once differences in needs is accounted for, the 
redistributive effects of publicly provided services are more modest than those derived using 
conventional equivalence scales. 17 
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